A Note on Market Segmentation and Bertrand Competition
Zhang Xu, Mingsheng Zhang, Wei Zhao
Abstract
In this note, we show that equilibrium profit is zero in Bertrand competition with a finite number of firms and consumers whose willingness to pay are bounded, under any market segmentation profile.
Create a lesson
Related papers
Comparison of Deterministic Information Providers
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer, Tao Wang
Fractional Assignment with 1 Preferences
Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong, Hanna Sumita et al.
Dynamic Pooling and Regional Participation in Deceased-Donor Organ Allocation
Genta Okada
Coalition strategy-proof anonymous binary social choice in a countably infinite society
Achille Basile, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, Surekha Rao
Segregation Monotonicity and the Measurement of Inequality in Social Networks
Deepankar Basu
AI and the Market for Signals
Doruk Cetemen, Emre Ozdenoren