Beyond persuasion: Mobile electoral interfaces in polarized societies

Abstract

Many traditional models of electoral dynamics emphasize opinion change, social influence and persuasion mechanisms. In contrast, contemporary polarized societies often exhibit relatively stable partisan blocs coexisting with an electorally relevant mobile population. We propose a minimal dynamical model in which electoral competition is governed not by direct persuasion between opposing blocs, but by the dynamics and allocation of a mobile electoral interface. The electorate is partitioned into two stable partisan blocs and a mobile fraction, while direct transitions between the polarized blocs are strongly suppressed. Mobile voters are allocated between the competing blocs through a Fermi-like probabilistic rule governed by rejection asymmetries. Analytical calculations show that the electoral susceptibility to political shocks is proportional to the stationary size of the mobile electoral interface, identifying electoral mobility as the key quantity controlling the macroscopic response of polarized systems to external perturbations. The model naturally predicts a continuum of mobility regimes, ranging from frozen polarization to highly responsive electoral states characterized by a broad mobile interface. These results suggest that, in strongly polarized elections, aggregate electoral changes may be governed primarily by fluctuations at the mobile electoral interface rather than by large-scale ideological conversion.