Slow and Steady: Preventing MEV with Verifiable Delays
Zeta Avarikioti, Dimitris Karakostas, Karl Kreder, Shreekara Shastry
Abstract
Our work presents a defense mechanism against Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) opportunities in distributed ledgers. The mechanism relies on the idea of enforcing a verifiable delay when generating transactions, such that a block creator cannot react to the appearance of a MEV opportunity without breaking liveness. We present positive results both in the Byzantine setting and in a game theoretic model of rational participants. We additionally present negative bounds that outline the limitations of this line of defense. Finally, we explore real-world implementation details of verifiable delays and show that, based on historical MEV data, our mechanism could realistically help prevent most existing MEV threats.
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