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Witness-Certified Fair Division with Comparison Queries

Tatsuhito Yamagata, Hanna Sumita

cs.GTarXiv:2608.16109

Abstract

We study fair division of indivisible goods when agents' valuations are accessed only through ordinal comparisons between bundles, with arbitrary tie-breaking. In this model, even deciding whether a given allocation is envy-free up to one good (EF1) can be impossible. This suggests explicit fairness certificates as a natural algorithmic object. Our main contribution is a certificate-preserving scaling framework, which recursively contracts goods, solves a smaller instance, and expands the solution while repairing an explicit envy-eliminating witness certificate. For arbitrary identical monotone valuations, this yields a certified EF1 allocation for n agents and m goods using O(n n (m/n)) comparison queries, within an O( n) factor of the Ω(n (m/n)) communication lower bound. For identical additive valuations, we additionally obtain a 1/2-MMS guarantee within the same query complexity. For non-identical additive valuations, exploiting our EF1+1/2-MMS algorithm, we accelerate the existing matching-based PROP1+1/2-MMS framework, improving the query complexity from O(n4 m) to O(n3 m). Finally, we study the structure of such certificates through k-witness EF1, a hierarchy between EF1 and EFX.

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