ShadowPath: Lookup-Private Credential Status Verification over Authenticated State

Abstract

Verifiable credentials let holders present digitally signed claims without requiring the issuer to participate in every presentation. Revocation complicates this privacy model because a verifier must determine whether a credential remains valid. Existing status checks may expose recurring identifiers, registry positions, or request metadata. Such information can serve as stable handles to link separate presentations. ShadowPath moves the credential status lookup to the holder. For each presentation, the holder proves, in zero-knowledge, that the credential has not been revoked under the verifier-selected registry root. The verifier learns the status result but not observable metadata. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first evaluation of Verkle trees for credential revocation and compare them with sparse Merkle trees to assess their applicability in real world applications. The comparison tests whether reducing path depth with Verkle trees offsets the higher cost of KZG-based authentication. Across 30 desktop trials, median Groth16 proving took 371.6ms with sparse Merkle and 2.11s with Verkle. Verification took 3.70ms and 7.55ms, respectively. Groth16 Verkle proving took about 3s on both primary mobile devices. The results show that shorter authenticated paths do not necessarily yield cheaper zero-knowledge proofs. With fresh session randomness, verifier-visible status data do not reveal whether two presentations use the same credential under the stated assumption of session-value independence. This guarantee excludes issuer-verifier collusion and synchronization traffic.