Jamming Extensions of Quantum Correlations Lead to Hidden Superluminal Signaling
Ravishankar Ramanathan, Xie Sicheng, Michał Eckstein, Paweł Horodecki
Abstract
Relativistic causality in certain spacetime configurations permits jamming - superluminal causal influences that nevertheless do not enable superluminal signaling. We fully characterize the correlations compatible with relativistic causality (RC) by extending the operator framework of PRL 104, 140404. When the underlying state is required to be quantum, we prove that any nontrivial jamming - whether state-independent or state-dependent - necessarily leads to hidden superluminal signaling. Thus, the only consistent possibilities are standard quantum correlations without jamming or the full relativistically causal correlation set, with intermediate jamming extensions of quantum correlations leading to signaling. As an application of our characterization, we investigate the security of device-independent (DI) cryptographic primitives against adversaries constrained only by relativistic causality. We construct explicit RC attacks that break DI bit commitment and DI secret sharing in jamming geometries, even when these protocols remain secure against no-signaling adversaries. Our results show that security against relativistic adversaries requires behaviors to be specified together with the spacetime locations of their measurement events; input-output statistics alone are insufficient.
Create a lesson
Related papers
Continuous variable distributed quantum sensing in integrated photonics
Bethany Puzio, Oliver M. Green, Joel F. Tasker et al.
Securing quantum error correction against misleading advice from AI agents
A. Barış Özgüler
Exact logical error rates for magic state cultivation
Kwok Ho Wan, Ainhoa Zapirain
Hamiltonian engineering via pulses: beyond group averaging
Ivan Beschastnyi, Lucah Patel, David Tinoco
Logarithmic-depth quantum simulation of boson sampling
Changhun Oh
Entanglement swapping across a five-node relay in a multiplexed quantum-classical network
Andrew R. Cameron, Jordan M. Thomas, Alexandru Macridin et al.