Easier, but Not Easy: Nash Welfare under Lexicographic Valuations
Soumil Aggarwal, Rohit Vaish, Jatin Yadav
Abstract
Maximizing Nash welfare over indivisible goods is a central problem in resource allocation. For additive valuations, the best-known approximation factor is roughly e-1/e≈0.692, and the problem is APX-hard. We study Nash welfare maximization under lexicographic valuations, where every good is worth more than the total value of all lower-ranked goods. This large-gap structure makes preferences almost ordinal, which might suggest that the problem becomes easy. We show, however, that the picture is more nuanced: although lexicographic valuations enable stronger algorithmic guarantees, they retain significant computational hardness. Our first main result is a (1/2-ε)≈(0.707-ε)-approximation algorithm for weighted Nash welfare under lexicographic valuations, improving over the inherited guarantee of roughly e-1/e. The algorithm rounds the configuration LP for Nash welfare, for which we show a matching integrality gap of 2. Our second main contribution is an exact algorithmic polynomial time framework for ordered lexicographic instances and doubling lexicographic instances. We introduce a domination-based branch-and-prune method for which we prove a mutual-exclusion property between sibling subtrees and use a matrix-based leaf-counting argument to bound the pruned recursion tree by a polynomial when the number of agents is constant. Finally, we show that large gaps do not eliminate hardness, as Nash welfare maximization is NP-hard even for ordered lexicographic valuations, and it is NP-hard to obtain a 0.9996-approximation even for doubling lexicographic valuations. Thus, lexicographic valuations make Nash welfare maximization easier, but not easy: they admit tighter approximation and exact algorithms in important cases, yet still require intricate techniques and preserve some of the hardness of the general additive setting.
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