Fine-Tuning Autobidders with Group Relative Policy Optimization
Anton Safin, Alexandra Khirianova, Andrey Pudovikov, Aleksandr Katrutsa, Egor Samosvat
Abstract
Automated bidding (autobidding) is a core component of modern online advertising systems. Within this component, advertisers delegate sequential bid decisions to algorithms that must maximize campaign value while adhering to constraints such as a limited budget and a target cost-per-click (CPC). One of the approaches to resolve the autobidding problem is to formulate it as a Markov decision process and use reinforcement learning (RL) to train a bid generation function. The standard RL framework is actor-critic, which consists of an actor network that generates actions and a critic network that estimates the value of those actions. In our setting, the action is typically a bid or related pacing multiplier, and the value is the expected return from the auction given the bid. However, the alternating training of actor-critic RL models leads to instability and reduced robustness to noise. To address these issues, we adapt the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) framework to the autobidding setting. This framework is a critic-free policy-gradient method originally developed for large language model post-training, where the ground-truth target is unknown. The autobidding setting shares this property, since the optimal bid is unknown in advance. Moreover, GRPO in the LLM domain is used to fine-tune the pre-trained model, and we use the same technique to enhance the performance of the strong heuristic baseline. We empirically compare Autobidding GRPO with actor-critic models, simple heuristics, and controller-based methods on the BAT, iPinYou, and AuctionNet benchmarks. Extensive experiments show that Autobidding GRPO consistently outperforms baselines in clicks and is the best or second-best method in conversion volume.
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