Reaching Fairness by Reallocating Goods
Robert Bredereck, Eva Deltl, Tanmay Inamdar, Pallavi Jain, Pranjal Pandey, Bin Sun
Abstract
Fair allocation of indivisible goods has largely been studied under the assumption that no prior allocation exists. Motivated by practical settings with pre-existing (and possibly unfair) allocations, we study how to achieve fairness through limited reallocations. Building on recent work on reformability/reallocations, we consider three fairness notions---envy-freeness (EF), envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX)---and optimize the number of goods reallocated. We analyze both the classical and parameterized complexity of these problems, providing a comprehensive analysis across multiple fairness notions.
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