Characterizing Privacy Risks of Quantum Machine Learning with Emergent Quantum-Native Access

Abstract

Quantum Machine Learning (QML) has shown rapid advances by utilizing quantum computing for machine learning tasks. Meanwhile, the privacy risks accompanying QML is also starting to be studied, which inherit privacy leakage channels from "classical" ML and also quantum-unique risks. Existing work on privacy-preserving QML largely focuses on a QML-as-a-service scenario, which generally assumes that the QML model owner provides only classical bit outputs to queries, while users (and adversaries) have only classical computing abilities. However, this view is increasingly challenged in a quantum-native world of quantum-capable users/adversaries, which may have access to both quantum computing abilities and access to quantum information output from service providers. In this paper, we aim to bridge this gap by examining membership inference attacks against QML models by demonstrating that increasing quantum access and quantum computing abilities provides provable theoretical privacy leakage and empirical adversarial gain. However, the probabilistic nature of QML introduces a gap between theoretical and empirical adversarial advantage. These results show that existing research on privacy leakage in QML models underestimates privacy leakage in emergent quantum-native access regimes, and we hope to establish a first step in examining potential privacy leakages for QML in the quantum-native world.