Electromagnetic Side-Channel Vulnerability in QKD Equipment
Mikio Fujiwara, Katsumi Fujii, Fumie Ono, Masakazu Ono, Akihisa Tomita
Abstract
Actual quantum key distribution network nodes may be vulnerable to side-channel attacks such as electromagnetic leakage. In this study, we measured electromagnetic emissions from a prototype quantum key distribution device implementing a time-bin decoy-state BB84 protocol with Y and Z bases. We measured the electromagnetic spectra and waveforms at distances of 0 m and 3 m from the transmitter and receiver inside an anechoic chamber. The results showed that the transmitter was the primary source of electromagnetic leakage, and distinct differences were observed between the quantum states generated at the third harmonic of the 1241.6 MHz clock.
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