Token Economy Design for Fair and Efficient Highway Congestion Management with Express Lanes

Abstract

We study the design of a token economy for highway lane allocation that aims to improve fairness without sacrificing traffic efficiency. Motivated by the San Mateo 101 Express Lanes Project, we consider a setting in which high-occupancy vehicles have unrestricted access to an express lane, while the remaining users can alternate between regular and express lanes by earning and spending nonmonetary tokens. We model the resulting interaction as a finite-population dynamic congestion game with heterogeneous time preferences and limited-information evolutionary policy revisions. Building on a mean-field approximation, we derive token prices that enforce the system-optimal lane split while inducing fairness over time through turn-taking. The scheme is evaluated in a microscopic traffic simulation with real-world demand data. The results show that the proposed prices yield nearly the same average travel time as a baseline scenario in which no lane is reserved as an express lane, while substantially reducing urgency-weighted perceived travel time. These findings highlight token economies as a promising alternative to monetary congestion pricing for fairer management of scarce road capacity.