SoK: Decentralized Agent Economic Infrastructure

Abstract

Decentralized agent economies increasingly build a single task from protocols that were designed and secured separately. This creates a simple problem: a workflow can look correct at each step and still produce the wrong outcome. For example, a correct escrow may release payment on an authorized approval that provides little evidence that the delivered work actually satisfied the task. We systematize this problem across the full lifecycle of an agent task. Our study organizes security and economic requirements into 17 property families over six stages, with receipt soundness and completeness assessed separately. We examine 12 systems and standards, five reusable mechanism families, and four classical baselines. We introduce guarantee closure, a task-relative criterion for determining whether guarantees established at one stage remain available and constrain the later decisions that depend on them. We apply the criterion to controlled and native workflows, covering 840 matched executions and an exhaustive 11,648-case check over a finite objective-task domain. Our results expose recurring failures between verification and settlement, where conforming work can remain unaccepted or valid evidence can be ignored. Public records and model judgments further distinguish recorded approval from evidence of task conformance, while economic analysis identifies the report, penalty, and shared-error assumptions behind these guarantees. These findings show where end-to-end guarantees fail and what must be repaired to preserve them across the workflow.