A 1/2-Approximation for Pandora's Problem with Deadlines
Shenyu Qin, Chihao Zhang, Yuhao Zhang, Zixuan Zhu
Abstract
Pandora's problem is a fundamental model of sequential search in which opening each box incurs a cost. We study the variant with deadlines, where each box has a publicly known deadline for both opening and selection. We prove that a simple threshold strategy achieves a 1/2-approximation to the optimal expected utility, improving the previous guarantee of (e-1)/(4e)≈0.158 due to Berger et al. (AAAI 2024).
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