Competitive Equilibrium for Linear Chores is CLS-complete
Qian Liu, Shinuo Ma, Yixin Tao, Minji Yang, Weiqiang Zheng
Abstract
The competitive equilibrium (CE) is a fundamental concept for markets, with applications to efficient and fair allocation of resources. We consider the fundamental question of computing a CE in the most basic Fisher market model where agents have linear preferences. While it is known that we can compute a CE in strongly polynomial time with linear goods, there is no known polynomial-time algorithm for CE with linear chores. Computing a CE for linear chores is known to be in CLS with no hardness results. In this paper, we prove that computing an exact CE in Fisher markets with divisible chores and linear disutilities is CLS-hard and thus CLS-complete. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first CLS-completeness result for a market equilibrium problem. On the technical side, we use the nonconvex dual Eisenberg-Gale (EG) program whose Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) points are CE [Chaudhury, Kroer, Mehta, and Nan, 2024], and the CLS-complete problem of computing a KKT point of a quadratic program [Fearnley, Goldberg, Hollender, and Savani, 2024]. We show that from any exact equilibrium of the constructed market, we can recover in polynomial time an -KKT point of the input quadratic program over the unit box.
Create a lesson
Related papers
Stability and Perfection in Constrained Weighted Network Games
Julien Fixary, Rémi Castera, Rida Laraki
Tight bounds for fractional and randomized truthful scheduling
Georgios Anastasiadis, George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias et al.
On Competing Sellers with Substitutable Goods
Moshe Babaioff, Yuval Grofman, Brendan Lucier et al.
On Existence and Computational Complexity of Quasi-strict Equilibria
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Xinhao Nie
One Strategic Woman: Sharp Ranks and a Persistent Core
Ron Kupfer
Regret Bounds for Market Making with Persistent Orders
Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni et al.