Uniqueness, Proximity, and Scaling in Atomic Splittable Polymatroid Congestion Games
Tobias Harks
Abstract
We give a polynomial-time algorithm for exact equilibrium computation in atomic splittable polymatroid congestion games with integral ranks and rational player-specific affine latencies with positive slopes. The algorithm first computes equilibria of associated integer-splittable games, in which demands are allocated in multiples of a common packet size. For arbitrary polymatroid bases, no polynomial-time algorithm for these discrete equilibria was previously known. We provide such an algorithm and use progressively finer packets to recover the continuous equilibrium exactly. Our proof uses the multiple-exchange theorem of Oki and Schwarcz (2025) to obtain two exchange matchings that yield equilibrium proximity under changes of packet sizes and ranks, independently of cost coefficients. We then bound the matching deficiency caused by rank changes and construct compatible submodular rank roundings. Together these give a polynomial-time packet-halving algorithm using polynomially many submodular-function minimizations and exact rational arithmetic. The analysis rests on a uniqueness theorem of independent interest: for arbitrary real polymatroid ranks and continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, convex latencies, we prove uniqueness of equilibria, resolving a previously open problem.
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