Evolutionary minority game with heterogeneous strategy distribution
T. S. Lo, S. W. Lim, P. M. Hui, N. F. Johnson
Abstract
We present detailed numerical results for a modified form of the so-called Minority Game, which provides a simplified model of a competitive market. Each agent has a limited set of strategies, and competes to be in a minority. An evolutionary rule for strategy modification is included to mimic simple learning. The results can be understood by considering crowd formation within the population.
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