Competition between adaptive agents: from learning to collective efficiency and back
Damien Challet
Abstract
We use the Minority Game and some of its variants to show how efficiency depends on learning in models of agents competing for limited resources. Exact results from statistical physics give a clear understanding of the phenomenology, and opens the way to the study of reverse problems. What agents can optimize and how well is discussed in details.
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