Influence of external information in the minority game
M. A. R. de Cara, F. Guinea
Abstract
The influence of a fixed number of agents with the same fixed behavior on the dynamics of the minority game is studied. Alternatively, the system studied can be considered the minority game with a change in the comfort threshold away from half filling. Agents in the frustrated, non ergodic phase tend to overreact to the information provided by the fixed agents, leading not only to large fluctuations, but to deviations of the average occupancies from their optimal values. Agents which discount their impact on the market, or which use individual strategies reach equilibrium states, which, unlike in the absence of the external information provided by the fixed agents, do not give the highest payoff to the collective.
Create a lesson
Related papers
Real-Space renormalization for the drawups and drawdowns of stochastic trajectories: universality classes for diffusion processes and random walks via the scale function
Cecile Monthus
Stochastic synthesis and degradation of arbitrary diffusive processes
Denis Boyer, Gabriel Mercado-Vásquez
Critical amplitudes of the Baxter-Wu model from MCPA and Wolff simulations: free-exponent and fixed-exponent fits
Vyacheslav Mozolenko, Ian Pile, Lev Shchur
Capillary Coarsening Drives Re-entrant Statistical Transitions in Early Coffee-Ring Growth
Arundas Chandradasan, Dileep Mampallil
Maximum entropy explanation for the ubiquity of power-law mechanical responses
Sverre Holm
Thermodynamic Bethe Ansatz for the Toda chain from inverse scattering transform
Alberto Brollo