Stochastic stability in spatial games
Jacek Miekisz
Abstract
We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple Nash equilibria is analyzed. In particular, we construct an example of a spatial game with three strategies, where stochastic stability of Nash equilibria depends on the number of players and the kind of dynamics.
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