Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice
Gyorgy Szabo, Csaba Toke
Abstract
A simplified prisoner's game is studied on a square lattice when the players interacting with their neighbors can follow only two strategies: to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) unconditionally. The players updated in a random sequence have a chance to adopt one of the neighboring strategies with a probability depending on the payoff difference. Using Monte Carlo simulations and dynamical cluster techniques we study the density c of cooperators in the stationary state. This system exhibits a continuous transition between the two absorbing state when varying the value of temptation to defect. In the limits c 0 and 1 we have observed critical transitions belonging to the universality class of directed percolation.
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