Statistical mechanics of voting
David A. Meyer, Thad A. Brown
Abstract
Decision procedures aggregating the preferences of multiple agents can produce cycles and hence outcomes which have been described heuristically as `chaotic'. We make this description precise by constructing an explicit dynamical system from the agents' preferences and a voting rule. The dynamics form a one dimensional statistical mechanics model; this suggests the use of the topological entropy to quantify the complexity of the system. We formulate natural political/social questions about the expected complexity of a voting rule and degree of cohesion/diversity among agents in terms of random matrix models---ensembles of statistical mechanics models---and compute quantitative answers in some representative cases.
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