Asymmetric Regulation on Steroids: U.S. Competition Policy and Fiber to the Home

Abstract

Fiber to the Home (FTTH) describes a set of emerging technologies with the potential to affect competition in local access. On one hand, the high cost of deploying fiber to the residence suggests limitations on facilities-based competition among FTTH networks. On the other hand, FTTH opens up new possibilities for service-level competition, defined as the sharing of a single network infrastructure by multiple higher-layer service providers, whether of the same or different services. Yet technology is hardly an exogenous factor that independently shapes future local access competition; the regulatory environment also plays a key role. By shaping expectations about future competitive requirements, current regulations influence network operators' deployment choices among competing FTTH technologies, as well as design choices made by vendors and standards bodies for technologies still under development.The current regulatory approach to FTTH is far from consistent. Network operators likely to deploy FTTH include Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs), incumbent cable operators, competitive access providers (including CLECs), independent telephone companies, and municipalities. This paper reviews the rules related to service-level competition that apply to each of these categories. In essence, the paper finds that if current regulatory trends continue, asymmetries in the regulation of service-level competition will be on steroids by the time FTTH starts being more commonly deployed. Current regulatory requirements are either non-existent, or extremely detailed and technology- and service- specific (e.g. UNEs). We argue that neither of these approaches is likely to achieve the desired result for FTTH, given the current state of flux in emerging FTTH technology.