Learning to Play Games in Extensive Form by Valuation

Abstract

A valuation for a player in a game in extensive form is an assignment of numeric values to the players moves. The valuation reflects the desirability moves. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the highest valuation. Valuations can also be revised, and hopefully improved, after each play of the game. Here, a very simple valuation revision is considered, in which the moves made in a play are assigned the payoff obtained in the play. We show that by adopting such a learning process a player who has a winning strategy in a win-lose game can almost surely guarantee a win in a repeated game. When a player has more than two payoffs, a more elaborate learning procedure is required. We consider one that associates with each move the average payoff in the rounds in which this move was made. When all players adopt this learning procedure, with some perturbations, then, with probability 1, strategies that are close to subgame perfect equilibrium are played after some time. A single player who adopts this procedure can guarantee only her individually rational payoff.