Some logics of belief and disbelief
Samir Chopra, Johannes Heidema, Thomas Meyer
Abstract
The introduction of explicit notions of rejection, or disbelief, into logics for knowledge representation can be justified in a number of ways. Motivations range from the need for versions of negation weaker than classical negation, to the explicit recording of classic belief contraction operations in the area of belief change, and the additional levels of expressivity obtained from an extended version of belief change which includes disbelief contraction. In this paper we present four logics of disbelief which address some or all of these intuitions. Soundness and completeness results are supplied and the logics are compared with respect to applicability and utility.
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