A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
Chiranjeeb Buragohain, Divyakant Agrawal, Subhash Suri
Abstract
Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. In this paper, we use ideas from Game Theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance.
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