NoSEBrEaK - Attacking Honeynets
Maximillian Dornseif, Thorsten Holz, Christian N. Klein
Abstract
It is usually assumed that Honeynets are hard to detect and that attempts to detect or disable them can be unconditionally monitored. We scrutinize this assumption and demonstrate a method how a host in a honeynet can be completely controlled by an attacker without any substantial logging taking place.
Create a lesson
Related papers
Decision-Focused Learning for Cyber-Physical Risk-Aware Power Grid Operations
Ayesha Siddiqua Dina, Ebisa D. Wollega, Afzal Hossain Sohag
ToFu: Exploiting and Fuzzing the LLM-Orchestrator-Tool Trust Boundary
Md Nazmul Islam Ananto, Pierre Prevost-Avenel, Colin Smith et al.
APEX-Harm: Evaluating Agent Safety in Shared Professional Workspaces
Ziyi Yang, Adel Bibi, Guohao Li et al.
A Systematic Study of Security Enforcement at Android Inter-Component Boundaries
Sandiyo Christan A
EviRepair: Evidence-Driven Agents for Reliable Vulnerability Repair
Yilian Shi, Qingyu Liu, Tianyi Zhou et al.
Towards Safe World Models: Risks, Defenses, and Evaluation
Xiaoma Wang, Litian Zhang, Xinze Shi et al.