Collective Choice Theory in Collaborative Computing
Walter Eaves
Abstract
This paper presents some fundamental collective choice theory for information system designers, particularly those working in the field of computer-supported cooperative work. This paper is focused on a presentation of Arrow's Possibility and Impossibility theorems which form the fundamental boundary on the efficacy of collective choice: voting and selection procedures. It restates the conditions that Arrow placed on collective choice functions in more rigorous second-order logic, which could be used as a set of test conditions for implementations, and a useful probabilistic result for analyzing votes on issue pairs. It also describes some simple collective choice functions. There is also some discussion of how enterprises should approach putting their resources under collective control: giving an outline of a superstructure of performative agents to carry out this function and what distributing processing technology would be needed.
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