On eligibility by the de Borda voting rules
V. Yu. Kiselev
Abstract
We show that a necessary condition for eligibility of a candidate by the set of de Borda's voting rules in [H. Moulin (1988), Axioms of cooperative decision making] is not sufficient and we obtain a version of the criterion. Let r(ai) be the score vector of a candidate ai, R be the set of all vectors r(ai), and let R' be the Pareto boundary of the convex hull R. Then there is a scoring s such that a candidate a wins with respect to the de Borda voting rule βs if and only if r(a)∈ R'.
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