Jeffreys priors versus experienced physicist priors - arguments against objective Bayesian theory
G. D'Agostini
Abstract
I review the problem of the choice of the priors from the point of view of a physicist interested in measuring a physical quantity, and I try to show that the reference priors often recommended for the purpose (Jeffreys priors) do not fit to the problem. Although it may seem surprising, it is easier for an ``experienced physicist'' to accept subjective priors, or even purely subjective elicitation of probabilities, without explicit use of the Bayes' theorem. The problem of the use of reference priors is set in the more general context of ``Bayesian dogmatism'', which could really harm Bayesianism.
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