Cooperation Dynamics with Environmental Feedback: Steady States and Transitions

Abstract

Cooperative behavior and its regulatory mechanisms are central to complex systems and evolutionary game theory. In natural populations, strategy updates and endogenous payoff environments interact bidirectionally, shaping cooperation. We propose a strategy-payoff environmental-feedback model for four canonical games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift, Stag-Hunt, and Harmony. Mathematical derivation reduces the high-dimensional coupled system to an analytically equivalent canonical replicator equation. Bifurcation diagrams, phase portraits, and simulations show how initial cooperation, temptation to defect, and punishment jointly regulate cooperation. Stag-Hunt and Harmony display bistability and initial-state dependence; Prisoner's Dilemma exhibits robust dynamics with stable mixed equilibria. Temptation and punishment drive sequential cross-type game transitions at critical thresholds. Sufficient punishment suppresses defection, shifts bifurcation thresholds, delays destabilization of cooperative steady states, and reshapes these transitions. Numerical tests confirm equivalence and stability switching. Spatial lattice simulations agree with theoretical predictions, supporting robustness. This work reveals regulatory mechanisms from endogenous payoff feedback and initial-condition sensitivity, providing a basis for understanding and optimizing collective prosocial behavior.