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Artificial Currency and Separate Selling: A 3-Approximation for Consumer Surplus

Yang Cai, Yingkai Li, Jinzhao Wu

cs.GTarXiv:2611.14509

Abstract

We study the allocation of indivisible items to buyers with additive values drawn from independent distributions. The objective is consumer surplus net of burnt payments. We consider artificial-currency mechanisms: buyers receive personalized budgets of a currency worthless outside the mechanism and use them to bid across items. The better of separate selling and artificial-currency mechanisms provides a 3-approximation to optimal consumer surplus. The guarantee holds at every Bayes--Nash equilibrium, without equilibrium selection. Both branches are necessary: either alone may capture only a vanishing share of the optimum. The proof decomposes benchmark surplus into a stable part captured by artificial currency and a variation covered by separate selling.

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