Analysis of common attacks in LDPCC-based public-key cryptosystems
N. S. Skantzos, D. Saad, Y. Kabashima
Abstract
We analyze the security and reliability of a recently proposed class of public-key cryptosystems against attacks by unauthorized parties who have acquired partial knowledge of one or more of the private key components and/or of the plaintext. Phase diagrams are presented, showing critical partial knowledge levels required for unauthorized decryption
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