Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics
Carlos P. Roca, Jose A. Cuesta y Angel Sanchez
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory has traditionally assumed that all individuals in a population interact with each other between reproduction events. We show that eliminating this restriction by explicitly considering the time scales of interaction and selection leads to dramatic changes in the outcome of evolution. Examples include the selection of the inefficient strategy in the Harmony and Stag-Hunt games, and the disappearance of the coexistence state in the Snowdrift game. Our results hold for any population size and in the presence of a background of fitness.
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