On the Nonemptiness of the Core: Connecting Cooperative Games and Asset Pricing
Bernard Cornet, Miklós Pintér
Abstract
We show that the Bondareva--Shapley theorem for infinite cooperative games can be derived from a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. The link is the Choquet extension of a game, viewed as a possibly nonlinear pricing rule on the space of measurable simple payoffs. Under this identification, balancedness translates into no arbitrage, and a linear functional dominated by the pricing rule yields an allocation in the anti-core; the core statement follows by duality. Applying the arbitrage-free pricing theorem of Cornet (2025), we recover the characterization of the nonvacuity of the core initiated by Schmeidler (1967) and established in full generality by Bartl and Pinter (2023) for bounded-below games. Unlike the earlier derivation in Cornet (2025), our argument does not require the game to have bounded variation or the collection of coalitions to be a σ-algebra.
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