Obvious group manipulations in voting
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustín G. Bonifacio, Federico Fioravanti
Abstract
We study obvious group manipulation in voting and characterize it as manipulation identifiable from a coalition's option sets alone. Our analysis focuses on two overlapping classes: tops-only rules and rules satisfying the majority criterion, including all Condorcet-consistent rules. On the universal domain with at least three alternatives, a tops-only rule is not obviously manipulable by groups (NOMG) if and only if it is dictatorial. For rules satisfying the majority criterion, NOMG is impossible when n,m≥3, except with four voters and three alternatives. We quantify the coalition sizes behind these restrictions, obtaining sharp bounds for efficient tops-only rules and an exact threshold for majority-criterion rules with odd electorates. In the exceptional configuration, we characterize an interval of NOMG scoring rules containing Borda, which is also Condorcet consistent there. We further characterize NOMG with two alternatives and apply our tops-only characterization to generalized median voter schemes and voting by committees.
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