Moral AI and the Erosion of Its Own Demand
Wallice Ao, Jiabin Wu
Abstract
We study the evolution of human preference frequencies and AI adoption when individuals can choose between a moral AI that rules out defection and an unconstrained AI that preserves discretion. By allowing users to commit to cooperation, moral AI can sustain cooperation even when cooperative preferences are too scarce to do so on their own. But this success has a cost. By turning otherwise dormant cooperative preferences into committed behavior, moral AI exposes its users to exploitation by selfish individuals, causing the population share of conditional cooperators to decline under evolutionary selection. As conditional cooperators become less prevalent, equilibrium adoption eventually converges to zero. Moral AI can therefore be self-liquidating. For initial shares between the moral-AI adoption cutoff and the threshold for cooperation without AI, moral AI generates cooperation while lowering the limiting share of conditional cooperators. Adoption ultimately vanishes, leaving a lower share of the preference type that initially sustained demand for commitment.
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