A Simple Proof of Koray's Theorem
Héctor Hermida-Rivera
Abstract
In this note, I provide a direct and self-contained proof of Koray's (2000) theorem, by which a neutral and unanimous social choice function is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. Koray's (2000) original proof relies on results by Sen (1970) and Houthakker (1950) to construct a social welfare function for each alternative set. He then shows that these functions are Paretian and independent of irrelevant alternatives, allowing him to apply Arrow's (1950, 1951) impossibility theorem. Instead, I construct a cyclic preference profile and show that the voter who ranks the chosen alternative first is the dictator on every finite nonempty alternative set.
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