An Enforcement Foundation for Constrained Equal Awards
Sinan Ertemel
Abstract
Standard claims problems take claims as given. We ask how rule selection changes when a certified claim can be augmented by a privately known component that is costly to verify. In a binary environment, equal treatment of equals, claim boundedness, and efficiency impose a sharp lower bound on the gain from exaggeration and hence on the expected auditing needed for truthful reporting to be weakly dominant. The constrained equal awards (CEA) rule attains this bound at every report profile through a correlated audit policy. Conversely, every profilewise audit-minimal rule is CEA. The pointwise result also makes CEA the unique admissible rule that minimizes expected verification cost under every prior over true claims.
Create a lesson
Related papers
Entry Deterrence with Public Signals: Revisiting the Chain-Store Paradox
Francesc Dilmé, Aaron Kolb
Obvious group manipulations in voting
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustín G. Bonifacio, Federico Fioravanti
A Simple Proof of Koray's Theorem
Héctor Hermida-Rivera
Cognitive Constraints and Misspecification Concern
Drew Fudenberg, Florian Mudekereza
Folk Theorems for Social Learning
Daniel Luo, Alex Wolitzky
Moral AI and the Erosion of Its Own Demand
Wallice Ao, Jiabin Wu