Obvious Group Manipulations and Top Trading Cycles
Ryoga Doi, Kazumasa Ikeda, Kensei Nakamura
Abstract
We introduce a group version of non-obvious manipulability, which is stronger than the original definition by Troyan and Morrill (2020) and weaker than group strategy-proofness, and study its implications in Shapley-Scarf housing markets. We provide several characterizations of the Top Trading Cycles mechanism using the new condition.
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